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Problem area 
Modern transport category aircraft such as the Airbus A320, A330, 
A380, Boeing 777 and 787, employ an increasing amount of 
automation in the cockpit. These so-called fourth generation 
aircraft enable this automation for flight control tasks, flight 
guidance/planning but also for the management of aircraft 
subsystems. Because of the increasing complexity of aircraft and 
the environment they must operate in (e.g. traffic), these systems 
have evolved to work semi or even fully automated, in order to 
reduce pilot workload. However, studies into other contingent 
effects of automation show that the reduction in workload also 
induced a sense of complacency as it detaches the crew from 
regularly monitoring or operating the process being automated. 
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Description of work 
A European research project, Manual 
Operations of Fourth  Generation Airliners 
(Man4Gen), is poised at determining these 
emerging control aspects of a high level of 
automation in the cockpit, in particular the 
difficulties experienced in responding to 
unexpected situations which requiring a 
transition from monitoring very reliable 
systems to active and authoritative 
decision-making and exercising full control 
of the aircraft. The study detailed in this 
report runs parallel to the Man4Gen 
project, but is instead focused on the 
problems related to manual control of 
usually fully automated sub-systems of the 
aircraft, in particular the fuel system. The 
study has developed a conceptual 
framework which models the process of 
decision making which occurs upon the 
failure of automated systems. A 
subsequent experiment scenario makes 
use of the Airbus A330 fuel system, which 
normally operates nearly completely 
independent from the crew. The scenario 
creates a diffuse situation where the 
failures in automation attempt to obscure 
a more serious underlying failure which 
may severely impact flight safety. This 
forces various decisions to be made by the 
crew, and allows the observation of their 
problem-solving behaviour.  
 
 
 
Results and conclusions 
Subsequent comparison of crew 
behaviours with flight performance 
indicators reveals that there are clear and 
repeated examples of behaviours and 
interactions with automation which 
improve performance, but also those 
which deteriorate performance. Specific to 
failures of such aircraft sub-systems, in this 
case the fuel system, results indicate that 
improved technical knowledge of the 
automated systems and improved 
understanding of the (diagnostic) 
procedures related to them, in 
combination with a suitable level of trust in 
the automation can lead to significant 
performance gains. Therefore, this study 
concludes that, given certain 
circumstances, differences in flight crew 
interactions and competencies with 
automated systems can definitely have a 
profound influence on their operational 
performance.  
 
Applicability 
The effect of such crew-automation 
interaction is not to be underestimated in 
its potency to effect flight safety. This 
study attempts to provide a holistic 
approach in contributing to the 
understanding of human-computer 
interaction in the cockpit, in expectation of 
future advancement of such control 
structures. 
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1 Introduction 
Coping with growing operational demands and complexities, fourth generation commercial 
aircraft employ an increasing amount of automation for flight guidance, planning, system 
management, etc. However, according to Malinge (2011), the accident rate of fourth generation 
airlines has stagnated. Although automated systems have evolved to reduce pilot workload, 
recent concerns exist about their safety effectiveness. Automation introduces a paradox: 
providing crews with necessary operational assistance simultaneously dissociates the crew from 
those operations. Unfortunately, this shift in pilot tasking exhibits itself in many forms of adverse 
crew behavior such as automation induced complacency (Manzey et al., 2012), automation bias 
(Mosier et al., 1998), decision making errors (Orasanu et al., 1998), lack of (procedural and 
declarative) system knowledge and/or manual control skills (Potter et al., 2012), which are all in 
turn aggravated by overconfidence (Wood, 2004) and fatigue (Caldwell, 2012). These behaviors 
contribute to the loss of situational awareness (SA), which is defined by (Endsley, 1995). Often 
these effects are precursors to a deterioration of control of the aircraft, leading to Loss of Control 
in Flight (LOC-I). According to the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA, 2013), LOC-I accidents 
are currently the leading type of fatal accidents. Notable accident cases which exhibit tell-tale 
signs of this problem are Colgan Air Flight 3407, Air France Flight 447, Air Transat Flight 236 and, 
more recently, Asiana Airlines Flight 214.  
 
One initiative investigating the aforementioned automation concerns is the European project 
Manual Operations of Fourth Generation Airliners (Man4Gen). Man4Gen aims to understand the 
problems that crews face in the rapid transition from a monitoring role to an active decision 
making role. The project intends to develop and evaluate mitigating strategies in training, 
operations and system design. While Man4Gen will focus on crew response to automatic flight 
control systems failures and flight path related situations, this study complements it by 
investigating operations with the automation of aircraft sub-systems, in particular the fuel 
system. The fuel system is an interesting example of a highly automated system on a fourth 
generation aircraft, particularly given the overall acceptance of the high level of automation in 
this system. To this end, the research objective of this project is to evaluate the knowledge, 
awareness and problem solving capabilities of fourth generation aircraft flight crews, during 
unexpected failures in highly automated [fuel management] systems. The results should indicate 
whether the current use of automation in the cockpit environment could be contributing to the 
stagnation of the accident rate, and how. It should be noted that this paper aims to present an 
academic overview of this study. A more comprehensive explanation of the methodology and 
results can be found in (Mohrmann, 2013).  
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2 Method 
2.1 Theoretical basis 
In order to couple loss of control with a loss of awareness, a conceptual framework was 
developed based on the concepts of SA, as proposed by Endsley (1995), and sensemaking (SM), 
as proposed by Hollnagel and Woods (2005). For this study, SA was broadly defined as the quality 
of awareness that an individual has of his or her (aircraft) state, system state, environment, 
location, etc.. SA is divided into three successive levels:  
 
1. Perception of reality 
2. Understanding these perceptions 
3. Projection this understanding into the near future 
 
The quality of each level is for a large part dependent on the quality of a lower level. SM theory 
complements SA theory; in this study SM has been defined as the cyclic process by which reality 
is periodically reviewed in order to update ones model, and distil an interaction with reality, 
which completes the awareness feedback loop. This so called Contextual Control Model (COCOM) 
(Hollnagel and Woods, 2005) has been expanded to an Extended COCOM (ECOM) which 
proposes that multiple loops are stacked (Figure 1) and connected to create an array of control 
loops ranging from compensatory control to anticipatory control.  
 
The critical link between SA and SM is 
that compensatory action at the 
tracking level of the ECOM may be 
coupled to a non-complex SA (i.e. 
Perception only), whereas anticipatory 
control is only possible when the 
individual maintains excellent 
awareness (i.e. good Projection), as 
illustrated at the higher ECOM levels. 
It follows that a fault in perception will  
fragment the basis of subsequent 
awareness levels, and that any higher 
level of [anticipatory] control will not interact with reality as expected. Perceiving such a  
cognitive mismatch between expectations and reality is experienced as the universally 
recognized cognitive state of Surprise: when things do not go as planned. 
Figure 1: Extended Contextual Control Model. (Hollnagel, 
2002) 
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The conceptual framework enabled the quality of a decision as a central concept, used as a 
medium to connect the level of control of the crew to their level of awareness. At this point two 
important assumptions were made concerning the quality of a decision:  
 
1. Decisions are rational choices completely based on the information that the decision maker 
perceives about his reality  
 
2. Decisions within the context of a specific understanding, will have a positive effect on the 
situation, given that this understanding matches reality  
 
These two premises shed some light onto the relations between understanding reality, making 
decisions and expected results. The four statements below further built upon these two premises 
and formed a layout of the final logic structure applied in this paper:   
1. The level of SA is, per definition, inverse to the level of cognitive mismatch between 
understanding and reality  
2. The quality of a decision is inverse to the level of cognitive mismatch  
3. A particular level of control is dependent on the quality of decision  
4. Therefore: The level of SA is causal to the level of control  
 
By this framework it was be possible to connect awareness with a level of control.  
 
2.2 Conceptual framework 
Automation awareness. In the context of subsystem automation, awareness was redubbed 
Automation Awareness (AA). The concept of AA related to areas of awareness specific to 
effectively operating the automation pertaining to a [fuel] sub-system. Good AA was defined as: 
“Exhibiting sufficient knowledge, familiarity and awareness of the functioning of an automated 
process, in order to retain complete control of the process at any time.” 
Four behavioral categories were proposed as factors affecting AA: knowledge, rules, attitude and 
teamwork. The departure point for the definition of AA was the skills, rules and knowledge (SRK) 
based reasoning concept proposed by Rasmussen (1983). Rule and knowledge based reasoning 
were adapted from the SRK concept as two of the four behavioral categories. Knowledge referred 
to both declarative and procedural knowledge of the system(s) at hand, but also of other 
operational details which were relevant in diagnostic or recovery steps. Rules referred to a pilot’s 
familiarity with and attitude towards procedures, checklists and other operational prescriptions 
and/or limitations. Skill based reasoning was omitted as such reflexive motor skills was not 
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expected to often come into play in resolving aircraft system automation problems such as those 
studied in this experiment. The third behavioral category was pilot attitude towards automation, 
based on several known effects such as automation complacency, (c)omission errors and trust. 
The fourth and last category was teamwork, in consideration of the effects of social/inter-
personal aspects of awareness building, notably Team and/or Shared SA (Endsley and Jones, 
1997). Especially when considering how complex diagnostics and task sharing often engage both 
crew members, it would be quite possible that shared awareness would be critical in effectively 
resolving such problems.  These four discerning behavioral categories constituted AA, and served 
as the basis of awareness upon which pilots would make their decisions to act. They were 
abbreviated to the K-R-A-T decision making affectors. 
Performance indicators. Upon making a decision, a crew’s actions would interact with reality, 
and would result in some level of control, depending if the interaction with reality was productive 
or counter-productive to the situation. Working from Assumption #2, it was stated that a crew’s 
decision would always be aimed at maximizing performance (the specific performance indicators 
will be discussed later in this section). Therefore, it was assumed that measurable performance is 
indicative of a level of control. Of course this was also dependent on the isolability and 
measurability of performance indicators, and that enough performance variability would be 
present. Additionally, considering the complexities of diagnostic and recovery strategies, two 
different crews may enable two different strategies which would result in the same level of 
overall performance. To mitigate such a nulling effect, performance was subdivided into smaller 
indicators centered about core decision making events in order to improve the fidelity of 
matching particular AA with particular performance.  
Correction factors. The final aspect of this conceptual framework was the set of three correctors 
which were also considered as possible unintended affectors of the quality of decision making: 
workload, simulator realism and fatigue. A workload that would be too high or low could 
introduce effects such as excessive docility or too much stress, which in turn would affect 
decision making. Workload was measured by means of a RAW NASA TLX test (Hart, 2006). 
Simulator realism could affect crew immersion, where too little immersion would result in 
unrepresentative behavior for actual aircraft operations. Realism was scored on a continuous 
scale for five categories: simulator hardware, simulator software, scenario setting, scenario 
events and an overall score. Fatigue could also severely impair proper decision making due to 
reduced cognitive functioning. Fatigue was measured by means of a discrete seven-point Samn-
Perelli scale. If any corrector correlated with performance, then the comparability of different 
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crews may be compromised as their behavioral 
bases would not be the same. Such correlations 
would serve to correct performance ratings 
before their comparison to crew AA. 
The three components of the conceptual 
framework are combined in Figure 2. This 
framework functioned by observing pilot 
behavior with respect to the four AA affectors, 
and correlating them to their respective 
performance ratings (albeit corrected). 
 
2.3 Experiment design 
This experiment diverged from a classic control and a test group setup, and focused on the 
observation of within-group variations of set of representative pilot participants. Where within-
group variations were limited, the study could still provide a more global insight into crew 
behavior and performance. This study applied a simulated flight environment in order to create a 
situation in which crews were forced to demonstrate their decision making with respect to fuel 
system automation. The choice for a fuel sub-system was made considering the criticality and 
complexity of such a system. Criticality was important in order to build sufficient motivation in 
crews to thoroughly resolve the issue. Complexity was important in order to force more 
expansive diagnostic procedures, which in turn allowed for the more (precise) observation of 
decision making processes. The Airbus A330-200 fuel system ranked high on both factors, and 
featured the additional benefit of offering a larger group of type-rated participants to select 
from.  
Scenario design. The A330 boasts very advanced automation in its fuel system. This made it well 
suited to create a very diffuse scenario with respect to the division of control between the crew 
and the system computers. The central objective of this scenario was to create multiple crew 
decision points where the outcome would be ambiguous to the crew. These decisions mostly 
pertained to their ability to control the fuel system. The scenario was set in a trans-Atlantic 
Extended Twin-engine Operational Performance Standards (ETOPS) flight from Europe to the 
Caribbean region, where the routing was very southerly, crossing the Azores and remaining 
equidistant between the African west coast and the U.S. east coast. The reason for this diversion 
was a tropical weather cell in the northern Caribbean region. The scenario would start about 
two-thirds into the cruise phase, approximately 25 minutes prior to the flight plan’s critical fuel 
Figure 2: Conceptual Framework Model 
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point (beyond that point the fuel plan ensured 15 minutes of fuel upon arrival, given an 
emergency descent to FL100 and continuing with one engine inoperative - an ETOPS flight 
planning condition). Furthermore, the preflight briefing mentioned two components which would 
be unusable during the flight (legal and according to the Master Minimum Equipment List). One 
was the Fuel Control and Management Computer (FCMC) No. 2 (of 2), which was important in 
relation to the FCMC 1+2 FAULT (loss of automatic fuel management). The other unusable 
component was a hydraulic accumulator fault, which had no further consequences and only 
served to distract the crew from the fuel system. During the scenario several failures and events 
steered crew expectations by priming their mind-set, which set the stage for misleading, 
confusing or surprising the crew. In essence, the scenario consisted of a fuel leak which was 
difficult to accurately diagnose, given the A330’s vast array of fuel tanks and piping. This failure 
was cloaked by faulted (fuel management) automation, which forced the crew to investigate 
manually/mentally. As the leak was central to the scenario, the leak rate was finely adjusted in 
order to provide the crew with sufficient time/fuel to reach several diversion fields, but to also be 
large enough in order to be noticed and evoke a sense of urgency. The leak rate of 1.5 kg/s was 
tuned to finely balance realism and challenge required to fully engage participants in their 
decision making process. The scenario was developed and validated together with operational 
experts on the A330 – both flight crew and system experts. All sessions were identical up to a 
particular Event 7, after which crews were able to diverge in their recovery attempts. Therefore, 
performance is only measured after Event 7. Behavior was monitored throughout, as behavior 
prior to Event 7 could also have had an impact on their course of action after Event 7. A detailed 
account of the scenario schema can be found in (Mohrmann, 2013). 
Resources & Planning. The experiments were hosted at the National Aerospace Laboratory 
(NLR), in the Generic Research Aircraft Cockpit Environment (GRACE) simulator. The generic 
cockpit could be modified to accurately represent several common cockpit environments, 
including the A330. The simulator also featured functionally sufficient automation and FMS 
features, and radio contact with (ATCo) in the simulator control room. The observer was seated 
inside the cockpit aft of the two pilots, and also played the occasional role of purser/cabin crew. 
The participants were 20 active duty A330 pilots (five captains, 11 first officers and four second 
officers), forming 10 valid cruise crew combinations (no two second officers, or two captains). 
Confederate air traffic controller roles were fulfilled by other A330 pilots familiar with mid-
Atlantic radio communication, although most of the ATC responses were anticipated and scripted 
ahead of time. 
Participants were invited for an “observation study”, and not informed about the true nature of 
the scenario. The experiments took place within one week to limit possible cross-contamination 
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of subject experience. Simulations were held during normal working hours to mitigate possible 
fatigue effects. Upon arrival, participants were familiarized with the simulator after which they 
were permitted to self-brief with a representative yet modified dispatch briefing document, and 
were informed they would start around two-thirds into the cruise phase. The experiment 
scenario duration varied between 50 and 75 minutes depending on the crew’s decision making 
speed. Each scenario ended when the crews practically exhausted their diagnostics, and 
communicated a diversion plan. 
 
Observations. Several different modes of information were recorded. The simulator recorded 
important flight and fuel system parameters (e.g. location, fuel tank quantities, failures, etc.). The 
simulator also facilitated audio and video recording of the pilots and displays. The observer 
recorded behavior, decisions and other notable occurrences during the flight. Participants filled 
in a post-hoc self-reflection form including measurements for corrector variables and a form 
asking about a pilot’s attitude towards automation, with six questions pertaining to the 
respondent’s feelings of trust, dependence, familiarity, etc. with respect to on-board automation 
in general. Lastly, the observer engaged both crew members together in a cognitive interview 
session, during which several important or unclear events were discussed, such that pilot 
rationale could better supplement observed behaviors. 
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3 Results 
3.1 Performance indicators 
Essentially, the most fundamental indication of good performance could be represented by the 
safety margin created by pilots. Given the nature of the failures, maximizing fuel on arrival (FOA) 
would be a heuristic for maximizing the safety margin during this emergency. Table 1 shows the 
range of FOA. 
Table 1: Fuel on Arrival values ranked from best to worst 
 
However, a single fundamental indicator was not sufficient in comparing two different crew 
strategies leading to the same FOA. Therefore this study introduced three sub-performance 
variables (subvars): amount of fuel leaked, fuel burn efficiency (kg/NM) and the distance flown. 
The combination of these variables fully represented all the possible ways to reduce the fuel 
quantity on-board (FOB), which was directly causative to the safety margin achieved. At this point 
it is important to note that the scenario differed slightly between crews, due to certain events 
being triggered by (variable) crew actions. All events up to Event 7 were effectively priming 
events and did not warrant any differences in crew diversion actions. Therefore all performance 
(sub-)variables were only evaluated from Event 7 onwards. Additionally, because the crews did 
not fly the aircraft until landing, their intentions for the remaining 1-1.5 hours (clearly verbalized 
before the end of each session) were used to extrapolate performance according to Airbus A330 
performance specifications. 
Subvar A: Amount of fuel leaked. This variable indicated how much fuel was lost through the 
leak after Event 7 until landing. For many crews they (nearly) exhausted all fuel which was 
available to the leak (which is approximately half of all FOB). The fuel leaked was calculated by 
finding the difference between the total reduction of fuel (between Event 7 and landing), and the 
amount of fuel burned (i.e. fuel used: FU). This subvar was also corrected for the fact that not all 
fuel can be leaked, and that the “leakable” amount of fuel varies with Event 7 timing. Subvar A 
provided an objective score of how well the crew was able to minimize fuel loss through the leak. 
Because the leaking tank would always be empty well before arrival, difference in diversion 
distances and airspeeds did not affect this value. Table 2 shows subvar A scores. 
Best performance Fuel on Arrival (kg) Worst performance 
4470.5 4020.2 3886.5 3688.1 3542.0 2799.1 2520.5 512.0 409.6 -500.3* 
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Table 2: Percent of leaked fuel which leaked ranked from best to worst 
Best performance Percent of leakable fuel actually leaked Worst performance 
41% 57% 60% 61% 63% 68% 68% 69% 73% 94% 
 
Subvar B: Fuel efficiency. This variable indicated how efficiently the crew configured their 
aircraft. This depended on a number of factors including the number of engines running, the 
altitude and airspeed. Some crews indicated actions that would affect the efficiency at some 
point well beyond the duration of the simulation. This information was used to correct the 
extrapolated efficiency. Using the distance flown since Event 7 plus the extrapolated distance to 
the diversion airport, this was combined with the total amount of fuel burned between Event 7 
and landing, which together determined the amount of fuel used by the engine(s) per nautical 
mile (NM). Airbus performance data was used to extrapolate fuel burn after the end of the 
simulation depending on the chosen cruise altitude and engine configurations. Table 3 displays 
the subvar B performance rankings. 
Table 3: Fuel efficiency ranked from best to worst 
 
Subvar C: Distance overflown. This last sub-variable indicated the quality of a crew’s diversion 
decision. Ideally, a good decision was made without delay, and to the nearest airfield. Upon 
Event 7, a crew would have the minimum information available to make a diversion call, even 
without a diagnosis. This variable calculated the nearest valid diversion field at Event 7, and 
compared this reference distance to the actual distance flown after Event 7 until landing. This 
was expressed as a percentage in which 20% overflown indicated that the crew flew 1.2 times 
the minimum achievable distance from Event 7. Both the time to make a decision as well as 
choosing the nearest most suitable airport were represented by this statistic. Table 4 displays the 
subvar C performance rankings. 
  
Best performance Fuel efficiency (kg/NM) Worst performance 
7.56 7.93 9.03 9.41 10.11 11.18 12.21 12.48 12.68 13.74 
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Table 4: Percent distance overflown ranked from best to worst 
 
Regression analysis. The three subvars were constituents of the total FOA. However, the 
fundamental safety margin of FOA could not be used as it was not easily corrected for Event 7 
timings. In order to correct for Event 7 timings, the FOA variable was replaced by a heuristic 
variable based on the amount of fuel used (FU: both leaked and burned) after Event 7. The FOA 
and FU/NM variables were regressed to each other and aligned very closely (p<0.001, R2=0.96). 
Subsequently, the three sub variables were regressed to the FU/NM heuristic variable using an 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) stepwise regression by backward elimination, and also exhibited a 
strong (explanatory) correlation (p<0.001, R2=0.946). 
3.2 Correction factors 
The three correction factors were regressed to the four performance variables (three subvars and 
FU/NM). All values were averaged per crew. All 12 regressions use crew-averaged values and 
followed stepwise regression by backward elimination of corrector sub-indices, with performance 
indices as the dependent variables. The only two regressions which exhibited marginally usable 
R2 (0.67, 0.64) values were the workload and realism relations with subvar C. However, these two 
R2 values were too inaccurate to warrant adapting the performance indicators with them. Even 
without clear regression results, average ratings could still shed light on the quality and suitability 
of the experimental setup for evaluation purposes. The results indicated that a mild workload 
was present, with a notable increase in mental demand. The realism scores showed moderate 
scores for hardware and software ratings, but much better ratings for the scenario. The fatigue 
ratings indicated that, according the Samn-Perelli scale, on average participants felt “OK, 
somewhat fresh” after the simulation session. 
3.3 Automation awareness 
Behavioral observations which constituted AA were sourced from live observer notes, 
audio/video recordings and interview notes, with the addition of an automation attitude 
questionnaire collected via the self-test form. Regression of the questionnaire results with the 
performance variables did not reveal any significant relations, however it was interesting to note 
Best performance 
Distance overflown  
(% of nominal Event 7 distance) 
Worst performance 
6% 13% 14% 18% 31% 35% 37% 39% 40% 49% 
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that on average pilots felt they are were control and had good oversight, but were less confident 
about knowing the role and necessity of automation in controlling the aircraft. 
Besides the questionnaire, the majority of the observations underwent processing prior to being 
merged with performance data. Observations were clearly redefined and subsequently initially 
classified according to the four AA affectors, and secondly classified according to their positive or 
negative contribution to the three performance subvars, creating 24 categories in total. It should 
be noted that all observations were processed without knowledge of that session’s performance. 
This was to prevent a performance indication bias during categorization. 
3.4 Combining behavior with performance 
Within each category, the ten sessions were ranked from best to worst pertaining to that specific 
performance subvar. This was the first time that performance data and behaviors were matched 
together. By aligning the results, it became clear that good performers tended to have more 
positive and less negative comments, and vice versa. At this point a process called Recursive 
Abstraction (RA) was started, which essentially performed several subsequent summarizing steps 
in order to combine observations into increasingly more general trends. For this, the “Ladder” 
technique was devised. The Ladder technique began with the poorest performer’s positive 
remarks, and then observes which behavior the second-to-last poorest performer exhibited, 
inferring that this change in behavior was causal to the improvement in ranking. The same was 
done for the negative comments, but worked in the opposite direction. The Ladder technique 
also employed a second phase in which the actual quantitative changes in performance were 
used to indicate which behavioral changes were more important (i.e. resulted in greater changes 
in performance). As a validation step, these behavioral changes were compared to the pilot 
responses to open questions about their experiences of surprise, unclarity and/or uncertainty. 
Only a few minor adjustments were required; on the whole the pilot and observer comments 
aligned well. The resulting 24 small cohesive descriptions of suspected causal changes in 
behaviors underwent RA again and were integrated across all three performance variables, 
resulting in eight conclusive paragraphs describing how each AA category either positively or 
negatively affected performance. Table 5 provides a very brief overview of the main points in 
these conclusions. 
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Table 5: Summary of behavioral results 
 
 Knowledge Rules 
Behavior to 
promote 
- Extensive knowledge of 
relevant technical details 
- Work effectively with a mental 
model of the problem 
- Rules-of-thumb being recalled 
- Good mental model of the 
current aircraft state 
- Assume worst case scenario 
- Complete understanding of 
structure/diagnostics 
- Understanding procedure 
limitations 
- Plan of action/read through 
 
Behavior to 
avoid 
- General lack of understanding 
of system operation 
- Poor mathematics and 
calculations 
- Unfamiliarity with various 
failure cases 
- Not suspecting unlikely 
occurrences 
- Distrust procedures 
- Poor awareness of suitable 
checklists 
- Do not read through the checklist 
- Do not go beyond the checklist 
 
 
 - Automation attitude - Teamwork 
Behavior to 
promote 
- Familiar with non-normal ops 
increases trust 
- Level of wariness, noting other 
information sources 
- Increase in trust increases 
performance 
- Generate options, have a plan 
- Active cross-checking 
- Setting priorities 
- Task sharing with multiple players 
Behavior to 
avoid 
- Lack of deeper interest 
- Attempt multiple resets 
- Assume problem will fix itself 
- Increased level of distrust; 
assume computer is always 
the culprit 
- Level of distrust in others 
- Increased reliance on others 
- Poor idea sharing 
- Too explicit task splitting 
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4 Discussion 
The conclusions drawn in this study based their validity and usefulness for a large part on the 
realism that the scenario obtained. The realism evaluation scores indicated that the scenario and 
its events rank as very realistic, but the simulator hardware and software less so. The low 
simulator rating was for the most part based on the warming-up scenario where the manual 
flight control model was not suitably calibrated for the A330. The experimental scenario only 
employed auto flight features which functioned normally, hence this study concluded that the 
low score did not weigh as much as it may seem. The high scenario scores were important in 
confirming crew immersion into the scenario.  With the suitable exception of mental workload, 
results indicated a low overall workload during the scenario, which was sought after. In addition, 
the low correlation between correctors and performance scores indicated that the scenario was 
more or less equally challenging and realistic for all crews, ratifying the comparability between 
crews.  To conclude, this scenario was arguably a sufficient basis to draw conclusions about crew 
behavior in real life. 
The second challenge in this study was to obtain objective ratings of performance. The scenario 
design intended to limit the number of contingencies without making it too obvious which 
options were possible. Given the fact that the fuel system was critically impaired, it could be 
argued that reduced flight endurance represented the largest flight risk at that time, and the best 
possible actions were arguably those which increased the fuel margin upon arrival. Subsequent 
use of sub-variable performances provided the detail in explanatory performance indicators in 
order to differentiate and grade different crew strategies leading to the same fuel upon arrival. In 
this way the scenario succeeded in creating an objective basis (in this case safety-related) for 
condemning or promoting certain behavior.  
The third challenge in the setup of this study was to facilitate fair grading of crew behavior. 
Inherent to the fact of humans making observations, bias and subjectivity are never completely 
removed. However, this methodology employed five techniques to mitigate subjectivity: 
1. The sheer number of initial observations dampened any observer opinions in specific 
observations 
2. All observations were verified between three different sources (notes, recordings, interviews) 
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3. Early in the process, observations were stripped of metadata, and were always treated 
separately from performance data (they were analyzed before the performance data) 
4. The Ladder technique performed an additional validation with pilot self-reflection remarks not 
used before 
5. Recursive abstraction enabled many (24) rankings based on objective performance, such that 
biases not already neutralized were suppressed by the generalization process 
In addition to this, throughout the RA process, comments seemed to line up very well as every 
stage, and positive and negative comments would often show complementary behaviors. 
Furthermore, the fact that the number of positive and negative remarks correlated with 
performance as expected (i.e. good performers have more positive and less negative remarks, 
and vice versa), indicated consistency in the observation process. 
The above provided evidence of a sound basis upon which conclusions may be made. Referring to 
the conclusive behaviors sampled in Table 5, many (underlying) behaviors showed clear overlaps 
with previously documented behaviors. Automation complacency (Manzey, 2012) was 
demonstrated by crews waiting for further warnings, expecting malfunctioning automation to 
still support their decision making and hesitating to take over from the automated system. 
Automation bias appeared more pronounced in the form of “checklist bias”, where crews blindly 
assumed that the procedures would deliver clarity and resolve the issue, when in many cases 
such overreliance only made the complex failure difficult to understand due to changing aircraft 
configurations. It should be noted that both automation and checklist biases were more 
prominent in pilots with less flight experience (in the A330). Crews which exhibited a better 
understanding of the way the systems work, in some cases extensive technical knowledge, as 
well as familiarity with the limitations of the procedures, noted these assets to be very beneficial 
in deciding which checklists to apply and setting an effective course-of-action. Both assessment 
and course-of-action decision making errors (Orasanu et al, 1998) were identified in, for example, 
misdiagnosing slowly changing system states (assessment error) and poor critical evaluation of 
the outcome of a checklist (a course-of-action error). In some sessions, certain cognitive 
challenges resulted in stress and tunneling which were expressed by cursing, holding on to the 
incorrect memory of a display and locking into an incorrect diagnosis. Crews performed better 
when they cross-checked actions with each other, and were able to check their expectations for 
system responses with observations from other information sources. Crew confidence worked 
well in some cases with experienced pilots, but overconfidence in those less experienced often 
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backfired into worsening surprise and confusion after noticing unexpected system responses 
upon checklist directives. This study also reinforced results from another study (De Brito and Boy, 
1999), in which survey results indicated that crew were in many cases unsatisfied with the 
current complexity and user-unfriendliness of checklist procedures; although this could arguably 
be the outcome of a systemic lack of knowledge about the systems concerned in the checklist, 
which was demonstrated in this study. The few crews with a more extensive understanding of 
how a fuel system operates (in general terms, not specifically the A330) were able to translate 
this knowledge to the checklist procedures of the A330, and arguably apply procedures more 
effectively. 
In summary, this study demonstrated that it is possible to effectively assess crew behavior in an 
ecological setting, using objective performance indicators. Based on the results of this study, four 
statements were made in lieu of the research objective: 
1. There were clear differences in crew behavior with automation, despite equal type-
qualifications 
2. Variations in AA have demonstrably resulted in a significant variance in safety margins – poor 
AA directly results in poorer decisions which, in this scenario, led to a reduction in safety 
margins 
3. Negative AA behaviors detailed in literature have been demonstrated to exist in an ecological 
context and also result in degraded performance, as proposed 
4. Variations in AA were not directly attributable to experience, rank or crew composition 
This study concluded that variations in crew-automation interaction should not be 
underestimated in their potency to affect flight safety. With aviation design and operational 
trends bolstering automation capabilities, minimizing training standards and simplifying the role 
of the pilot, the effects of AA on safety may become more pronounced without due 
consideration for the unintended side effects. In light of a stagnating accident rate, the 
methodology and results of this study may help identify which AA mechanisms and behaviors 
should be prevented but also, more importantly, identify positive examples of AA mechanism 
and behaviors which should be promoted. Further studies can use these analyses to direct new 
training, HMI and operations design initiatives to effectively improve the crew-automation 
interaction system. The Man4Gen project is already paving this path upon their experimental 
results.  
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Although this project has succeeded in identifying behaviors which impact performance and 
safety, it does not yet explain how these (variations in) behaviors come to be in the first place. An 
attempt at correlating behavior with specific attributes such as flight experience, leadership skills, 
technical knowledge, etc. may help in further defining which competencies could be spearheaded 
in training and selection programs. An example of such an attempt is Project Samurai (Gorter and 
Jaeger, 2014), which attempted to investigate whether biofeedback training could improve 
manual flight control by accelerating psychological and somatic recovery after stressful events. 
Finding the source of behaviors may be critical in defining the effective solution. 
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W H A T  I S  N L R ?  
 
The  NL R  i s  a  D utc h o rg an i s at io n th at  i de n t i f i es ,  d ev e lop s  a n d a p pl i es  h i gh -t ech  know l ed g e i n  t he  
aero s pac e sec tor .  Th e NLR ’s  ac t i v i t i es  ar e  soc ia l ly  r e lev an t ,  m ar ke t-or i en ta te d ,  an d co n d uct ed  
no t- for - p ro f i t .  I n  t h i s ,  th e  NL R  s erv e s  to  bo ls te r  th e gove r nm en t ’s  i n nova t iv e  c apa b i l i t ie s ,  w h i l e  
a lso  p romot i ng  t he  i n nova t iv e  a n d com p et i t iv e  ca pa c i t ie s  o f  i t s  p ar tn er  com pa ni e s .  
 
The NLR,  renowned for i ts leading expert ise,  professional  approach and independent consultancy,  is  
staffed by c l ient-orientated personnel who are not only highly ski l led and educated,  but a lso  
continuously  strive to develop and improve their  competencies. The NLR moreover possesses an 
impressive array of  high qual ity research fac i l i t ies. 
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